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impose a penalty upon the accused. The defendant would still be
coerced into forfeiting his absolute right not to testify before the
determination of guilt in order to gain another right:3 9 the right
to a rational determination of sentence. Only a two-stage trial would
fully protect a defendant from infringement of his privilege against
self-incrimination.
If Johnson is read in light of the extended protection offered under
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, it indicates
an important defect in the criminal procedure of most states. 40 Two
possible alternatives are available to correct this defect. The legisla-
tures of five states have now provided for a two-stage trial in all
capital cases.4 1 However, the legislative process is generally slow and
legislators are not necessarily acquainted with the procedural prob-
lems faced by courts. 42 A better solution has been reached by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
which has directed its lower courts to bifurcate any trial in a capital





TO MOTOR DRIVEN GOLF CARTS
Guest statutes exist in a majority of states1 to protect owners and
be set aside if it appears that the defendant was not asked if he had anything
to say why sentence should not be pronounced. Ball v. United States, 140 U.S.
118 (1891).
mSee Simmons v. United States, 39o U.S. 377 (1968).
'0See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, lOl U. OF
PA. L. REv. lO99, i1oo (1953).
"CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1 (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-1o (Supp.
1966); N.Y. REV. PEN. LAW § 125.80 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1968);
TEX. CODE CRM. PRoc. art. 87.07 (1966).
"Anton, The Legislature, Politics and Public Policy; x959, 14 RuTGERs L.
Ray. 269 (196o).
"3Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
909 (1965).
"ALA. CODE tit. 86, § 95 (Recompiled 1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-913 (Repl.
Vol. 1957); CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 17158 (West 1960); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-9-1 (1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 6101 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 820.59
(1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1401 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95Y2, § 9-201
(Smith-Hurd 1958); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1021 (Repl. Vol. 1965); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 321.494 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-122b (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101
(Rev. 196o); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 32-1113 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-740
(1948); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.180 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-1 (1953); N.D.
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operators of motor vehicles from liability for simple negligence2
which causes injury to guests being gratuitously transported.3 The
South Dakota guest statute reads:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor
vehicle as his guest without compensation for such transpor-
tation shall have cause of action for damages against such
owner or operator for injury, death, or loss, in case of acci-
dent, unless such accident shall have been caused by the willful
and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such
motor vehicle .... 4
The Supreme Court of South Dakota recently refused in Nepstad v.
Randall5 to apply the statute to motor vehicles not designed primarily
for public highway transportation when operated upon private prop-
erty at the time of the accident.
In Nepstad the operator of a motor driven golf cart0 provided
gratuitous transportation for another golfer whose own golf cart
had run out of gas on the golf course. While riding on the hood of
the cart, the guest was thrown to the ground and injured when the
operator made a sudden turn. The injured guest sued to recover
damages and in his complaint alleged that the defendant's negligent
operation of the motor driven cart had caused the accident and
injury. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it failed to state a cause of action in alleging only ordinary
negligence. The defendant contended that under the provisions of
the guest statute the plaintiff was required to allege willful and wan-
ton misconduct on the part of the defendant-operator. The trial court
CENr. CODE § 39-15-02 (1960); OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Baldwin 1964);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.115 (1967), S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-8O1 (1962); S.D. CODE §
44.0362 (1939); TEx. Rr.v. Civ. STAT. art. 67 oib (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-9-1
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1491 (RepI. Vol. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646.1
(Repl. Vol. 1957); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.08.08o (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-233
(Compiled 1967).
'See Ar. JuR. 2D Desk Book Doc. 123 (1962), for a listing of states having
guest statutes and the degrees of fault required to be shown under each in order
to hold uncompensated motor vehicle owners and operators liable to guests in-
jured during operation of a motor vehicle.
'Ast. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 471 (1963).
'S.D. CODE § 44.0362 (1939).
5152 N.W.2d 383 (S.D. 1967).
GThe motor driven golf cart involved in the principal case is described in
a dissenting opinion as being "a miniature pickup in design. Its gasoline motor
is in front covered with side panels and a hood like a conventional car. It is
equipped with a windshield, steering wheel, balloon tires, gear shift, self starter,
transmission, seats for two persons, a luggage rack in the rear, bumpers, hand and
foot brakes, headlights, a tail light, and a cloth canopy top. Records... show
similar devices are licensed to operate on the public highways of this state [S.D]."
Id. at 388.
CASE COMMENTS
denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint holding the guest
statute inapplicable. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff, and
the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "a motor
driven golf cart while being operated on a golf course is not a 'motor
vehicle' within the meaning of the guest statute."
7
The majority in Nepstad construed "motor vehicle" as referring
either to motor vehicles designed for use on public highways or to
motor vehicles not so designed but being operated upon a public
highway at the time of an accident. They concluded that, a motor
driven golf cart would be within the meaning of "motor vehicle"
as used in the guest statute, only if operated on a public highway,
rather than on private property, at the time of the accident. This
decision prompted one dissenting opinion.
When faced with a problem of statutory construction courts have
applied a variety of so-called "rules of construction." Although some
may be given more weight than others initially, there are many ex-
ceptions to them and there is much interplay between them.
The cardinal rule for construction of a statute is to ascertain the
specific legislative intent.8 Where the language of a statute is plain
and unambiguous, such intent is to be determined from the language
itself.9 However, the literal meaning of a statute will not be followed
where it leads to a result contrary to the legislative intent as derived
from other sources,' 0 i.e., legislative purpose, definitions in statutes
themselves, and prior interpretations. In construing a statute the
broad legislative purpose is a prime consideration in determining legis-
lative intent."1 The majority of courts construing guest statutes give
considerable emphasis to what they consider the legislative purpose
71d. at 386. Besides the issue of whether the motor driven golf cart was a motor
vehicle within the meaning of the guest statute, other issues argued on appeal in
the principal case were: whether the plaintiff had assumed the risk of being
thrown from the hood of the golf cart; whether the defendant was negligent;
whether the comparative negligence statute was applicable to the case and whether
evidence as to loss of earning power justified the trial court's instructing the
jury as to such.
sSelective Life Ins. Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States,
ioi Ariz. 594, 422 P.2d 710 (1967); Prout v. Monroe, 4 Conn. Cir. 15, 224 A.2d 566
(1966); State Highway Comm'n v. Hemphill, 269 N.C. 535, 153 S.E.2d 22 (1967).
OState v. Logan, 198 Kan. 211, 424 P.2d 565 (1967); State v. Level], 181 Neb.
401, 149 N.V.2d 46 (1967); State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 312, 422 P.2d 353 (1956).
1 'Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d i9S (D.C. Cir. 1966); People v. Ali, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 424 P.2d 932 (1967); Newbolt v. Board of Educ., 409 S.W.2d 513
(Ky. 1966).
"Employees Serv. Ass'n v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 672, 52 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1966); Oppelt v. Mayo, 26 Conn. Supp. 329, 223 A.2d 47 (1966); Illinois Nat'l
Bank v. Chegin, 35 I1. 2d 375, 220o N.E.2d 226 (1966).
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behind guest statute enactment. 12 Although the majority in Nepstad
concluded that highway safety was the purpose of the guest statute,
such statutes are generally interpreted as being designed only to re-
lieve uncompensated owners and operators from liability for ordi-
nary negligence which causes injury to "ungrateful"'13 guests. 14 An-
other purpose often assigned to guest statutes, and the one which the
Supreme Court of South Dakota has earlier assigned to its guest
statutes,15 is the prevention of fraud and collusion between gratuitous
guests and operators of motor vehicles against liability insurers.16
These same motives which prompted legislatures to deprive guests
of their common law right of action when accidents occur on a public
highway apply with equal force to accidents occurring on private
property.' 7 In Kitchens v. Dufield's the court remarked "it is just as
reprehensible for a guest to sue his host for ordinary common law negli-
gence in the operation of his motor vehicle on a private way as it
would be on a public thoroughfare." 19 In Fishback v. Yale20 a gra-
1-Truitt v. Gaines, 199 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1g6i), afJ'd, 318 F.2d 461 (3d Cir.
1963); Fishback v. Yale, 85 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1955); Nielsen v. Kohlstedt, 254 Iowa
470, 117 N.W.2d goo (1962); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Kitchens v. Duffield, 83 Ohio App. 41, 76 N.E.2d 1ol (1947),
aff'd, 149 Ohio St. 500, 79 N.E.2d 906 (1948); Oswald v. Weiner, 218 S.C. 206, 62
S.E.2d 311 (1950); Schlin v. Gau, 8o S.D. 403, 125 N.W.2d 174 (1963); Houston Belt S:
Terminal Ry. v. Burmester, 39 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Andrus v. Allred,
17 Utah 2d so6, 404 P.2d 972 (1965); Becket v. Hutchinson, 49 Wash. 2d 888, 308
P.2d 235 (1957); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
lsDym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 2o9 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
14Truitt v. Gaines, 199 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. ig61), aff'd, 318 F.2d 461 (3d Cir.
1963); Nelson v. McMillan, 151 Fla. 847, 1o So. 2d 565 (1942); Nielsen v. Kohlstedt,
254 Iowa 470, 117 N.W.2d 9oo (1962); Gifford v. Dice, 269 Mich. 293, 257 N.W. 830
(1934); Dym v. Gordon, 16 'N.Y.2d 120, 2o9 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965);
Spring v. Liles, 236 Ore. 140, 387 P.2d 578 (1963); Oswald v. Weiner, 218 S.C. 2o6,
62 S.E.2d 311 (1950); Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d io6, 404 P.2d 972 (1965);
Jensen v. Mower, 4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683 (1956); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d
578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
I'Schlim v. Gau, 8o S.D. 403, 125 N.W.2d 174 (1963).
6Truitt v. Gaines, 199 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1961), afJ'd, 318 F.2d 461 (3d
Cir. 1963); Rogers v. Lawrence, 227 Ark. 117, 296 S.W.2d 899 (1956); Naudzius v.
Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (1931); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209
N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (s965); Kitchens v. Duffield, 83 Ohio App. 41, 76
N.E.2d io (1947), aff'd, 149 Ohio St. 500, 79 N.E.2d 9o6 (1948); Schlim v. Gau, 8o
S.D. 403, 125 N.W.2d 174 (1963); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Burmester, 309
S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d
664 (1967).
"1 Cram v. Inhabitants of Cumberland, 148 Me. 515, 96 A.2d 839 (1953); City
of Redfield v. Wharton, 79 S.D. 557, 115 N.W.2d 329 (1962); Hickerson v. State,
161 Tex. Cr. App. 140, 275 S.W.2d 8oi (1955)-
1183 Ohio App. 41, 76 N.E.2d ot (1947), aff'd, 149 Ohio St. 500, 79 N.E.2d
906 (1948).
1976 N.E.2d at io6.
"085 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1955).
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tuitously transported guest was injured in an automobile accident
which occurred on a hunting club's private road. The Supreme Court
of Florida nevertheless held that its guest statute2' applied. Courts
in Ohio22 and Washington 23 have also held guest statutes applicable
when automobile accidents occurred off the public highways.2 4 Con-
sidering the generally assigned legislative purposes, it appears un-
necessary for the court to infer that motor vehicles not designed pri-
marily for public hig~hway transportation are exempt from the
operation of the guest statute while they are being operated on pri-
vate property.
Unlike the South Dakota guest statute and the majority of others,
the guest statutes of five states25 eliminate consideration of the loca-
tion of the vehicle at the time of the accident in determining guest
statute applicability. These five statutes expressly limit their applicabil-
ity to motor vehicles being operated upon a public highway at the time
of the accident.26 However, in the absence of language indicating such
a restrictive intention courts have generally treated the fact that the
accident occurred on private property27 irrelevant.
As mentioned earlier, another possible source for determining
legislative intent is the definitions included with the statutes. In de-
termining what is a "motor vehicle" for guest statute purposes, the
majority in Nepstad referred to the definition of "motor vehicle" con-
tained in the statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles on
2FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.59 (1958).
22Kilgore v. U-Drive-It Co., 149 Ohio St. 505, 79 N.E. 2d 9o8 (1948); Kitchens
v. Duffield, 83 Ohio App. 41, 76 N.E.2d 1o (1947), aff'd, 149 Ohio St. 5o0, 79
N.E.2d 9o6 (1948).
2Becket v. Hutchinson, 49 Wash. 2d 888, 3o8 P.2d 235 (1957).
2 The Supreme Court of Kansas in In re Hayden's Estate, 174 Kan. 140, 254
P.-d 813 (1953), held the Kansas guest statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-122-b (1964),
inapplicable to an airplane accident because the accident did not occur on a
public highway.
=ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-913 (Repl. Vol. 1957); CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 17158
(West 196o); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.180 (1963); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 67olb
(1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-9-1 (1953)-
mE.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-913 (1947) which reads:
No person transported as a guest in any automobile vehicle upon the public
highways or in aircraft being flown in the air or while upon the ground,
shall have a cause of action against the owner or operator... for damage on
account of any injury, death or loss occasioned by the operation of such ...
unless such vehicle or aircraft was wilfully and wantonly operated in dis-
regard of the rights of others.
-Fishback v. Yale, 85 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1955); Kilgore v. U-Drive-It Co., 149
Ohio St. 505, 79 N.E.2d 908 (1948); Kitchens v. Duffield, 83 Ohio App. 41, 76
N.E.2d 1O (1947), aff'd, 149 Ohio St. 500, 79 N.E.-d 906 (1948); Becket v. Hutchin-
son, 49 Wash. 2d 888, 808 P.2d 235 (1957).
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public highways, 28 statutes intended to promote highway safety. The
majority reasoned that because the guest statute was in the Code
chapter containing highway safety statutes it was therefore a highway
safety statute and controlled by the definitions applicable to such
statutes. The special concurring opinion in Nepstad29 revealed that
the guest statute was originally enacted independent of the highway
regulations and was located in a separate Code chapter prior to the
Code revision. No statutory provision made the highway regulation
definitions applicable to the guest statute.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that where existing
provisions are incorporated into a codification without change they
are deemed to retain their original meaning30 and relative position
after incorporation.31 In construing a particular section of revised
statutes, courts should refer to the original statutes to determine the
meaning of the section.32 Furthermore, the location of a statute in
a revised codification may not be used in the construction of the
statute33 because shifting a statute from one chapter to another does
not require the courts to abandon the prior judicial construction of the
statute.34 The special concurring opinion in Nepstad criticized the
majority's reliance upon the location of the guest statute in the Code
in construing the statute.
Reference to the highway regulation statutes in construing the
guest statute involves the rule of construction that laws in pari
materia are to be construed with reference to each other.35 However,
the rule that statutes in pari materia must be construed to-
gether is only applicable to statutes which relate to the same sub-
ject matter 36 or have the same scope and aim.37 When statutes have
21S.D. CODE § 44.030 (1939).
2152 N.W.2d at 386.
10Adamowski v. Bard, 193 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1952); Robertson v. Dorsey, 195 Md.
271, 73 A.2d 503 (195o); State v. Conally, 227 S.C. 507, 88 S.E.2d 591 (1955); City
of Redfield v. Wharton, 79 S.D. 557, 115 N.W.2d 329 (1962).
31 In re Meservey's Will, 34 Del. 482, 155 A. 593 (Super. Ct. 1931).
2Cram v. Inhabitants of Cumberland, 148 Me. 515, 96 A.2d 839 (1953); City
of Redfield v. Wharton, 79 S.D. 557, 115 N.W.2d 329 (1962); Hickerson v. State,
161 Tex. Cr. App. 140, 275 S.W.2d 8oi (1955).
33Publix Asbury Corp. v. City of Asbury Park, 18 N.J. Super. 286, 86 A.2d
798 (1951).
aPetron v. Waldo, 272 Minn. 513, 139 N.W.2d 484 (1965).
• -State v. Taylor, 49 Hawaii 624, 425 P.2d 1014 (1967); State ex rel. Schwab
v. Riley, 417 S.W. 2d i (Mo. 1967); State ex rel. Retchless v. Cook, 181 Neb. 863,
152 N.W.2d 23 (1967); Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Battle, 154 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va.
1967).
"Graham v. Corporon, 196 Kan. 564, 413 P.2d 110 (1966).
1 Board of Pub. Instruction v. State ex rel. Hilliard, 188 So. 2d 337 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1966).
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no common purpose and scope and do not relate to the same object,
thing, or person they are not in pari materia38 and are not to be
construed together.30 The guest statute has been held to operate in
the field of substantive law and not to be part of highway regulations.
40
Thus the pari materia principle should not apply.
However, even assuming that the highway regulations and the
guest statute are in pari materia and the highway regulations defi-
nition controlling, the Nepstad majority disregarded permissive lan-
guage in the definitions. The South Dakota Code's highway regula-
dons define "vehicle" as "every device in, upon, or by which any
person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public
highway....-41 and define "motor vehicle" as "every vehicle, as herein
defined, which is self-propelled..4.."42 The Nepstad dissent consid-
ered the motor driven golf cart, even under the highway regulations
definition, to be clearly within the class of motor vehicles which
may be used upon a public highway, noting that some motor driven
golf carts have been licensed for operation on South Dakota high-
days. Nevertheless, the majority in Nepstad selectively extracted
from the definitions the phrase "upon a public highway" and
defined "motor vehicle" in the guest statue to include only motor
vehicles in use upon a public highway, rather than applying the en-
tire definition.
Courts construing guest statutes have frequently mentioned that
such statutes are in derogation of common law and some courts have
enunciated support for strict interpretation 3 against owners and
operators. Others have declared support for liberal interpretation 44
in their favor. However, even courts which declare that guest statutes
are in derogation of common law and should therefore be strictly corl-
3Singleton v. Larson, 46 So. 2d 186 (Fla. ig5o).
'Bernhardt v. Long, 357 Mo. 427, 209 S.V.2d 112 (1948).
"Kitchens v. Duffield, 83 Ohio App. 41, 76 N.E.2d lo (1947), afJ'd, 149 Ohio St.
500, 79 N.E.2d 906 (1948).
"S.D. CODE § 44.o3o1(a) (1939) (emphasis added).
'-S.D. CODE § 4 4 .o3 oi(b) (1939).
"rTruitt v. Gaines, igg F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1961), aff'd, 318 F.2d 461 (3 d
Cir. 1963); Rogers v. Lawrence, 227 Ark. 117, 296 S.W.2d 899 (1956); Praeger v.
Israel, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 98 P.2d 732 (1940); Lloyd v. Runge, 186 Kan. 54, 348 P.2d
594 (1g6o); Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 App. Div. 2d 22, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1oo (1959);
Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957); Voelki v. Latin, 58
Ohio App. 245, 16 N.E.2d 519 (1938); Spring v. Liles, 236 Ore. 140, 387 P.ad
578 (1963); Brown v. Gamble, 60 Wash. 2d 376, 374 P.2d 151 (1962).
"Nielsen v. Kohlstedt, 254 Iowa 470, 117 N.W.2d 900 (1962); Cappellano v.
Pane, 178 Neb. 493, 134 N.W.2d 76 (1965); Peterson v. Snell, So S.D. 496, 127
N.V.2d 142 (1964); Schlim v. Gau, 8o S.D. 403, 125 N.W.2d 174 (1963).
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